【英国青年社会学理论家系列之三】惯习理论新见：把行动的反思性带回来

【英国青年社会学理论家系列：3/3。原预告文见link，前两期见页底）

Elder-Vass, Dave. 2007. ‘Reconciling Archer and Bourdieu in an Emergentist Theory of Action’. Sociological Theory 25 (4):325–46.

  Elder-Vass是Loughborough 社会学系的Reader。

或许是2005年以后毕业的（2006年phd），做社会学理论的，英国最受关注的一位。critical realism/emergenitsm一系代表人物，已经出了三本专著了：

The Causal Power of Social Structures( Cambridge University Press, 2011)

The Reality of Social Construction (Cambridge University Press, 2012)

Profit and Gift in the Digital Economy  ( Cambridge University Press, 2016)

————

当布迪厄想从disposition的角度来解释“惯习”这个“黑箱子”的时候，他不得不面对：行动如何具有反思性？的挑战。

当布迪厄想从body的角度来解释“惯习”这个“黑箱子”的时候，他不得不面对：认知神经科学对身-心关系的研究成果。

Elder-Vass的文章，就是这两个挑战的汇流。

1. 布迪厄对惯习是怎么定义的

The conditionings associated with a particular class of conditions of existence produce habitus, systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them. (Bourdieu 1990b:53)

看似，布迪厄没有忽视惯习的生成作用：

The dispositions that make up the habitus do not operate in a rule-like fashion, mandating particular specific actions; rather, each disposition provides a “generative capacity” (Bourdieu 1990a:13, 1990b:55),

但是，布迪厄并认为这种惯习是自发的、无需意识（consciousness）参与运作的

The habitus, Bourdieu tells us, provides “a spontaneity without consciousness or will” (Bourdieu 1990b:56), and this is typical of his way of presenting the habitus—he frequently (though not always, as we shall see below) neglects the role of conscious thought in both the development and the operation of the habitus.

2. 布迪厄的惯习，到底有没有自主反思、有意识地调整呢？

有。但很例外。

布迪厄通过mismatch分析，认为只有危机只，通过磁滞效应才能理解惯习相对于场域的自主性。

Crises, of a variety of types, are possible causes of such mismatches ... Such mismatches, gaps between expectation and experience, tend to generate not only a need for conscious deliberation but also a need for modifications to the habitus itself (Bourdieu 2000:149).

（注：之前推送过 “磁滞效应”的概念史、布迪厄式及其拓展的分析，link）

那么，布迪厄不是还谈反思社会学吗？是的。他只从学术人的角度使用反思，而已。

In other words, researchers tend to think of “acting agents” as thinking theoretically about the world

3. 如何弥补布迪厄的问题？

——毕竟，人不光是有自发且无需意识的惯习，还有反思、自主的一面。

Elder-Vass借镜于Archer（以谈人的反思性、内在交谈、个人认同而闻名）的突现论（emergentism），并从认知神经科学入手：

第一，接受Jean Searle的观点，从脑—意识的角度入手理解行动；

John Searle, for example, argues that consciousness itself must have neurophysiological causes:

第二，打开布迪厄的“惯习”——这个含糊且万能的概念的“黑箱子”——找出mechanism，分为四个方面：

1. 信念形塑——神经网络层面/倾向性层面

belief formation: we develop beliefs and dispositions（布迪厄的词） as a result of our experience, which are implemented at the neural level as neural networks;

2. 决策制定——有意识的思考层面+神经网络层面

decision making: we possess the causal power to think consciously about our plans, and make decisions, which are co-determined causally by our thinking powers and the network of beliefs that they work upon;

3. 决策贮藏：重整到神经网络层面，调整原有的倾向性

decision storage: having made decisions, these are stored in our neural networks as new or modified dispositions (note that there may be multiple loops back to Step (2) before an action actually occurs, including the “last minute” conscious review of some of our decisions);

4. 行动执行：在行动的一刻，不再需意识神经网络的自我反思，直接影响执行。

action implementation: our actions are determined directly and immediately by nonconscious brain processes, which use our beliefs, dispositions, and skills as inputs.

（Sociological理论大缸第155期）

链接：

Elder-Vass的个人网站：http://www.eldervass.com/